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ACTING TO LET SOMEONE DIE 
Dr Andrew McGee 
INTRODUCTION 
A prominent view in medical ethics today is that withdrawal of life support is an 
act of killing. As Julian Savulescu has recently explained: 
In neonatal intensive care, it is not uncommon for a doctor to withdraw 
artificial ventilation with the consequence that a baby dies. If anyone else 
performed that act, including the parents of the child, it would be viewed 
as an act of homicide, in some cases murder. But when a doctor performs 
that act, it is not murder. The active withdrawal of life-prolonging medical 
care (an intentional act that kills, even if not necessarily with the intention 
to kill) is a standard part of medical practice in relation to people who 
experience severe disability and suffering.1   
In making this point, Savulescu rejects the legal view that withdrawal of life-
support is an omission which allows the baby to die. One reason this view, 
according to Savulescu, is unsatisfactory is that it has the absurd consequence 
that the person authorised to withdraw (normally, the doctor) has merely omitted 
to provide further treatment, whereas anyone else who acted to withdraw the 
                                                          
1 J. Savulescu. Abortion, infanticide and allowing babies to die, 40 years on. Journal of 
Medical Ethics 2013; 39(5): 257-259, p. 257. 
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treatment “would be judged to have acted in such a way as to kill, not to be 
‘omitting to save life’ or letting die”.2 He explains this absurdity as follows: 
The very same act is described in law as an ‘act’ or an ‘omission’, 
depending on whether or not a doctor performs it. Whether it is right or 
wrong might depend on whether a doctor performs it, but the nature of 
some physical event cannot logically depend on the identity of the person 
involved. A parallel is that ‘running’ is a certain kind of action of the body, 
whether or not a doctor or someone else is performing it.3 
Savulescu uses these points to argue that the standard common sense view that 
infanticide is always wrong might actually be illogical. For we are, on this view, 
already allowing infanticide to occur whenever a doctor, in neonatal intensive 
care, withdraws ventilation – or other forms of life-support such as artificial 
nutrition and hydration (ANH) – with the consequence that the baby dies. How is 
that different, then, from giving a lethal injection to the same patients? 
These arguments echo claims advanced in the organ donation context by Franklin 
Miller and Robert Truog. In their recent book, Death Dying and Organ 
Transplantation,4 the authors argue that while they accept that withholding life 
sustaining treatment (LST) is an omission and does not cause death, withdrawing 
LST is an act and does cause death.5 Switching off a ventilator, for example, is like 
turning out the light by pressing a light switch or stopping one’s car running by 
                                                          
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 F. Miller & R. Truog. 2012. Death, Dying and Organ Transplantation Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
5 Ibid: 26. 
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turning the ignition key.6  Just as the latter cause the light to go out, and the car to 
stop running, so switching off the ventilator causes the oxygen supply to stop, and 
thereby causes the patient’s death. The traditional ethical and legal view that 
withdrawal can also be classified as an omission and merely allows the patient to 
die is ‘patently’ false7 and has been advanced merely because we subscribe to 
two incompatible views: 
1. That it is not wrong for doctors or other qualified medical professionals to 
withdraw LST; and 
2. Causing death is killing and so is morally wrong.8 
The combination of these incompatible views leads us to adopt the moral and 
legal fiction that withdrawing LST does not cause death but merely lets the 
patient die.9  But, echoing the passage quoted from Savulescu, Miller and Truog 
claim that we must not confuse the view about whether it is right or wrong to 
withdraw LST, with the quite different view about whether it causes death or 
merely lets the patient die. Withdrawal of LST, for the reasons just given, causes 
death. Objecting to euthanasia, or organ procurement causing death, on the basis 
                                                          
6 Ibid: 9-10. 
7 Ibid: 4, 9 and 12.  See also F. Miller, R. Truog & D. Brock. Moral Fictions and Medical 
Ethics. Bioethics 2010; 24(9): 453-460, p. 454. 
8 Miller & Truog, op. cit. note 3, p. 3. 
9 Ibid. 
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that these practices kill the patient is unsatisfactory, for we are already routinely 
killing the patient whenever we withdraw LST from them.10 
 Although these claims are prima facie plausible, closer critical scrutiny shows that 
they are open to objection, and that the traditional view that withdrawing LST 
should be classified as letting die rather than killing can be defended. Part of the 
difficulty stems from the fact that omissions are normally contrasted with acts, 
yet letting die can take place by means of omissions or acts. If we apply the word 
‘omission’ to withdrawal of LST, such as the withdrawal of a feeding tube or the 
withdrawal of artificial ventilation, this seems to be incompatible with the fact 
that withdrawal involves the act of removing the tube or turning off the ventilator 
switch. However, there are specific reasons offered in the case of Airedale NHS 
Trust v. Bland11 for this classification which have largely been ignored by critics. 
Savulescu is right that the law – particularly the Bland judgement – held that 
withdrawal should be classified as an omission when undertaken by a doctor, but 
as an act when undertaken by an interloper but, again, there are reasons given for 
this in the Bland case that are not discussed by critics. In addition, it is important 
to note that the case also held that withdrawal of LST would be allowing the 
patient to die,12 and that Anthony Bland would die of his underlying condition. 
This finding influenced the court when classifying withdrawal as an omission. For 
reasons we shall see, the position the law has taken on these issues is defensible. 
                                                          
10 This argument is advanced to support their claim that organ procurement causing death 
cannot be criticised on the ground that it causes death, since that would mean that we 
would also have to abandon withdrawal of LST. See Miller & Truog, op. cit. note 3, Ch. 6. 
11 [1993] AC 789. 
12 See Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789. 
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In defending the legal position, my argument will be three fold: 
1. If we understand the claim that withdrawal is an omission as the claim 
that withdrawal allows the patient to die, one source of our problem – 
that omissions are normally contrasted with acts and so cannot apply to 
withdrawal but only withholding LST – disappears, and the question 
simply becomes: can withdrawal of LST be classified as letting die rather 
than killing?; and 
2. We can indeed classify withdrawal as letting die, even though acts are 
involved; and 
3. We can consistently classify unauthorised withdrawals as killing, rather 
than as letting die. 
If these arguments are sound, then we cannot, pace Savulescu and Miller and 
Truog, appeal to the fact that we already sanction killing as a way of arguing for 
permitting euthanasia, organ donation euthanasia, or as a way of showing that 
our opposition to infanticide may not be altogether coherent. 13 
 
                                                          
13 Note that my aim is the more modest aim of defending the logical distinction between 
killing and letting die where withdrawal of LST is concerned. The further question of 
whether that distinction is morally relevant will not be addressed in this paper. The 
criticisms of Savulescu and Miller and Truog are criticisms about the logic of classifying 
withdrawal of LST as an omission and about the relevance or otherwise of the identity of 
the person engaging in the withdrawal – and the relationship between these points and 
the killing/letting die distinction. 
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I. WITHDRAWING TUBES, FLIPPING SWITCHES, OMITTING TO TREAT, AND 
LETTING DIE 
Let us begin with the criticism of Bland that it wrongly characterised withdrawal of 
ANH as an omission. On the face of it, this seems like a very strong criticism. But it 
should be remembered that the judgement held that ‘the doctor, in discontinuing 
life support, is simply allowing his patient to die of his pre-existing condition’.14 
The Law Lords therefore did not believe that they were sanctioning the killing of 
Anthony Bland, the patient who had fallen into a persistent vegetative state as a 
result of the Hillsborough disaster. In this regard, Lord Browne-Wilkinson made 
some comments that have been overlooked by critics. He pointed out that, in the 
case of ‘withdrawing’ ANH, the feeding tube can simply be left in place until after 
Anthony had died.15 Withdrawal of LST in such a case would not be accomplished 
by means of such physical acts as withdrawing a tube. Rather, it would be a 
                                                          
14 Italics added. Lord Goff, Lord Lowry and Lord Browne Wilkinson all thought the patient 
was being allowed to die. According to John Keown, ‘a majority of the Law Lords judge 
that it would be lawful to withdraw...tube-feeding even though they thought that the 
doctor’s intention was to kill’: J. Keown. 2012. The Law and Ethics of Medicine. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press: 13-14. But although the Law Lords might have used ‘incautiously 
sweeping language’ when speaking, as they did, of an ‘intention to bring about death’ (see 
Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789, p. 876–7), it is also clear that the Law Lords 
found that death would not be caused by the doctors, but by Anthony’s underlying 
condition. They did not believe that they were sanctioning killing.  
15 Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789, p. 882. These remarks of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson are examined in more detail in my 'Does Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining 
Treatment Cause Death or Allow the Patient to Die?' (forthcoming, Medical Law Review). 
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straightforward refraining from providing any further nutrition and hydration the 
next time it was due to be provided. This shows that what is doing the operative 
work is the omission to provide any further treatment to Anthony. Indeed, it is 
important to note that we need not even leave the tube in place until after 
Anthony had died. Instead, we could simply refrain from providing the nutrition 
and hydration the next time it is due and, at that time, we could withdraw the 
tube. The act of withdrawing the tube would, in that case, be causally impotent.  
Why have these considerations been overlooked? In two decades of criticism of 
the Bland judgment, this point has rarely been acknowledged.16 One reason for 
this is that we perhaps have not paid enough attention to the fact that withdrawal 
cannot always be contrasted with withholding. A number of cases of withdrawal 
are really like cases of withholding to the extent that the treatment being 
‘withdrawn’ is not always ongoing but is merely being provided periodically. 
Dialysis, the provision of ANH, and some provisions of ventilation, can all take 
place periodically. In such cases, when a decision is made not to provide any more 
treatment, that decision can be implemented by simply refraining from providing 
                                                          
16 It is not acknowledged, for instance, by Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, who make 
the following comment on the Bland case: ‘But in contrast to omitting to put up another 
bag of artificial nutrition when it ran out naturally, this withdrawal of treatment is causing 
a change (from Bland’s having a feeding tube to having none) that leads to death’ (I. 
Persson and J. Savulescu. McMahan on the Withdrawal of Life-Prolonging Aid. 
Philosophical Books (2005); 46(1): 11-22, p. 16). The remarks I have just made in the text, 
developing Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s point, answer this criticism: the removal of the tube 
is causally impotent, and we simply refrain from providing the nutrition the next time it is 
due. This means that it is exactly like omitting to put up another bag of fluid. The criticism 
of Persson and Savulescu therefore fails. 
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it the next time it is due. On this basis, it does not seem at all problematic to 
regard the ‘withdrawal’ as an omission – an omission to provide further 
treatment, and so as a decision to withhold the next bout of treatment. For in 
such cases, no physical acts of withdrawal need be involved at all. These 
considerations would vindicate the Bland judgment,17 which concerned precisely 
the provision of ANH – Anthony Bland was not ventilator dependent because his 
brain stem, which regulates his breathing, remained intact. 
If the Bland judgement is to remain objectionable on the grounds offered by 
Savulescu, Miller and Truog, it cannot be on the basis that acts of withdrawal are 
involved – at least not if we are dealing with ANH. The considerations just 
                                                          
17 At least in respect of the criticism that withdrawal cannot, contra Bland, be classified as 
an omission. A separate controversy concerns the sense in which straightforward 
omissions can be causal. This controversy can take two forms. The first concerns omissions 
as such, or in general. In what sense, if any, do I cause a consequence if I stand by and do 
nothing? Neither Savulescu nor Miller and Truog consider that particular issue and for 
reasons of space I must leave that issue aside here. For discussion, see A McGee. 
Omissions, Causation and Responsibility. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 2011; 8(4): 351-361. 
The second form concerns omissions after having done something – for instance, 
omissions which take the form of stopping something you have been doing or refraining 
from continuing on. For instance, if I have been treating someone and then I refrain from 
treating them further, then it might be asked whether, even if that refraining is correctly 
classified as an omission, it may nonetheless now be regarded as causing the consequence 
to the extent that I intervened to begin with, and simply stopped intervening down the 
track. After all, if I have been prolonging someone’s life, and then cease to prolong it, my 
ceasing to prolong it at that time must surely cause the patient to die at that time? 
(Thanks to Franklin Miller for raising this point). This form of the controversy is discussed 
below in section II.  
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discussed are enough, I contend, to vindicate the classification of withdrawal of 
ANH as an omission to provide further LST in this case. 
This raises the question, however, of whether we can regard all withdrawal of LST 
in the same way. Clearly, some treatment is provided in an ongoing way. Some 
cases of ventilation are a good example. In many cases of ventilation, its provision 
is ongoing and constant. Stopping ventilation in such a case seems to require 
either the removal of the tube or the flipping of a switch. We cannot, in such a 
case, escape the fact that acts are involved in the withdrawal. This makes it much 
harder to classify the withdrawal as an omission in these cases. However 
justifiable the Bland position might be in respect of ANH, it seems as though the 
considerations offered in favour of that view cannot extend to the withdrawal of 
ventilation.  
One way of responding to this is to say that we need to take into account the fact 
that life-sustaining treatment was started in the first place. What we are 
contemplating, in deciding whether to withdraw LST, is whether and for how long 
we should keep sustaining life – how long we should keep on arresting the dying 
process that, without the continued provision of the measures we are providing 
to the patient, would engulf the patient and cause their death. Looked at in this 
way, ventilation should be seen as an extension of human acts, a much more 
sophisticated, and technological, version of what is no more than mouth to mouth 
resuscitation. In that respect, ceasing to ventilate is akin to refraining from 
providing further ventilation.  
A difficulty with this suggestion is that it would seem to mean that one could say: 
switching on and turning off lights, as made possible by modern technology, 
should be seen as an extension of human acts, such as lighting a fire and then 
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letting it go out. On this basis, turning out the light is refraining from keeping the 
room illuminated, having initially switched on the light, and so is an omission. Yet 
this suggestion is surely absurd.  
This point should be conceded. But we should ask whether no case of ceasing to 
do something by means of acts can be classified as an omission. Although 
switching off the light can’t be so classified without extreme awkwardness, other 
acts seem less prone to this kind of awkwardness. I might, for instance, refrain 
from pouring as much lager in the pint glass, at my client’s request, by flipping 
back the tap handle on the pump after initially assuming he wanted me to pour a 
full pint. I might refrain from putting as much petrol in my tank as usual by 
withdrawing the nozzle earlier than I normally do because of the recent price 
hikes in the cost of petrol.  Although suggestive, none of these examples are 
adequate. It remains awkward, for example, to speak of omitting to put as much 
beer in the glass, or petrol in the tank, as normal. While the word ‘refraining’ from 
putting as much in is less awkward, it is tortuous indeed to describe either of 
these examples in terms of omissions. Once we are dealing with ongoing 
treatment, it is hard to characterise the conduct by which we stop that treatment 
as an omission. On the other hand, we can describe this conduct in terms of 
discontinuation. We can say that I discontinued pouring the pint, that I 
discontinued filling up my tank with petrol, and that the doctor discontinued 
treatment. But ‘discontinue’ reads like an action verb. It seems to describe 
something I do, rather than something I do not do.  Perhaps we need to be 
cautious here. As Wittgenstein would say, perhaps we need to make sure we are 
not taken in by the surface grammar of the verb ‘discontinue’. That verb really 
signifies stopping action, rather than action. If we say that stopping is itself an 
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action, we are in danger of tying ourselves in knots.18 However, this response only 
works up to a point. In some cases, we clearly do discontinue conduct by means of 
actions. Flipping switches on ventilators is a paradigm case of this. Even if we call 
it ‘discontinuing’ treatment, it’s hard to call it an ‘omission’. 
The criticisms that have been made of Bland have therefore only partially been 
answered. Although the analysis of Bland, which deals with the withdrawal of 
ANH, seems to apply without objection to treatment which is not ongoing, and so 
would apply to cases of dialysis in addition to ANH, it does not seem able to apply 
in the same way to ongoing forms of treatment. In these cases, ceasing to do 
what one was doing, especially when it involves acts like flipping switches or 
removing tubes, is not really describable as an omission.19 If we deny that these 
are acts, we seem to be denying the obvious.  
But could we describe withdrawal in these cases nonetheless as allowing rather 
than causing, and so as letting die rather than killing? Recall, the main point in 
Bland is that withdrawal of LST in general is allowing the patient to die, rather 
                                                          
18 Some regard even straightforward omissions and refraining as acts. James Rachels 
famously said that even when I stand by and let someone die, ‘I do perform at least one 
act…. I do not save him, but I do let him die’:  J Rachels. 2001. Killing and Letting Die.  In 
Encyclopaedia of Ethics. 2nd edn. Vol 2.  London, UK: Routledge: 949. But this seems to 
obliterate the distinction between action and inaction, and arguably confuses the auxiliary 
form of ‘do’ for an action verb. Compare: ‘I do not lie down, but I do fall asleep’. See A 
McGee. Ending the Life of the Act/Omission Dispute: Causation in Withholding and 
Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Measures. Legal Studies 2011; 31(3) 467-491, p. 474 . 
19 For an argument that flipping a switch could be classified as an omission and is so at 
law, see A McGee 'Does Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment Cause Death or Allow 
the Patient to Die?’ (forthcoming, Medical Law Review). 
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than killing. As I have argued, I believe the main reason Bland held that 
withdrawal of ANH is an omission is that it had the killing/letting die distinction in 
mind. Omissions are paradigm cases of standing by and allowing something to 
happen, but they are not the only case of letting happen. We can also let things 
happen by means of acts. For instance, I can allow the room to cool down by 
turning off the heating. This is different from cooling it down by turning on the air-
conditioning. Could we say, as Miller and Truog suggest in the case of 
withdrawal,20 that I switch the heating off first, and only then allow the room to 
cool down? This would seem to make it impossible to capture the distinction 
between switching off the heating, and turning on the air-conditioning. For on this 
recommendation, I equally could say: I turn on the air-conditioning, and then 
allow the room to cool down. The crucial difference is that we seem, in the case of 
the air-conditioning, to be actively and artificially cooling the air by machinery, 
changing the natural temperature which would otherwise impinge on the room. 
We are, as it were, the source of the temperature in the room. In allowing the 
room to cool down having heated it, by contrast, we are allowing the room to 
reach its natural temperature, having artificially heated it ourselves. ‘Natural’ 
temperature here means only the temperature that the room would have if not 
adjusted by human action, in accordance with the temperature outdoors. 
In these cases – allowing the room to cool down versus cooling it down via air-
conditioning,21 or allowing the room to warm up versus heating it up with a 
                                                          
20 Miller & Truog, op. cit. note 3, p.  4. See also Persson and Savulescu, op. cit. note15, p. 
16. 
21 Note that we can also stop cooling the room down by switching off the air-conditioning. 
In doing so, we allow the room to warm up again – unless we turn off the air-conditioning 
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heater – the distinction between allowing and causing seems clear enough,22 and 
is not affected at all by the fact that acts are involved. We naturally speak of 
allowing the room to cool down or to warm up, as the case may be, as opposed to 
cooling it down or warming it up ourselves, even though acts are involved – such 
as the act of switching off the heating. The source of the actual heat or cold – 
whether it is something provided by us or not – is relevant to the distinction 
between allowing the room to cool down/warm up on the one hand, and cooling 
it down or warming it up ourselves on the other.  
The same considerations might at first glance seem to apply to the distinction 
between killing (causing death) and letting die. Withdrawal, it might be said, is 
considered to be letting die rather than killing because it allows a process to 
continue that was originally halted in its tracks by the provision of the LST. Just as 
we do not say that we “allow the room to cool” down if we artificially cool it down 
with air-conditioning, as opposed to letting it cool down of its own accord, so we 
don’t normally say that we allow the patient to die if we actively introduce an 
agent into his body to kill him, whether that be a drug, or a knife, a bullet, etc. On 
the other hand, if the patient is dying of his own accord then if we don’t 
intervene, we let him die. But if we intervene to stop that process, but then 
discontinue our intervention, we regard that as allowing the resumption of a 
causal sequence that was already underway, rather than as initiating a new causal 
sequence. 
                                                                                                                                                    
when it is no longer hot outside. In that case, we allow the room to reach the current 
temperature outside, or its natural temperature. 
22 But see my remarks below. 
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But it is important to note – and I will return to the significance of this point 
shortly – that this distinction can also be expressed in terms of two different ways 
of causing a consequence. In the air-conditioning and heating cases just discussed, 
allowing a consequence can still be causing that consequence, in the sense that I 
turned off the heating and allowed the room to cool down by doing so. Although I 
am not the author of the room temperature in the way that I would be if I turned 
on the air conditioning, I am the author in the sense that my turning off the 
heating is what allows the room to cool down and so causes the room to cool 
down in that sense. The fact that acts are involved, then, still seems to make a 
difference and makes it more appropriate to distinguish, not between causing and 
allowing but rather between two different ways of causing, one of which is 
allowing. 
This point seems to prevent the application of these analogies to the distinction 
between killing (causing death) and letting die. The analogies may indeed show, as 
I have argued, that one can let things happen by means of acts. But they don’t 
show that one can distinguish letting things happen from causing to them to 
happen, as is required by the killing/letting die distinction. For once we concede 
that letting the room cool down can still be described as causing it to cool down, it 
would follow that letting someone die could, by parity of reasoning, be described 
as causing them to die. And once that is conceded, the killing/letting die 
distinction seems to dissolve since killing is, by definition, causing death.23  It is 
                                                          
23 The law defines killing as ‘causing death’ in all common law jurisdictions and in criminal 
statutes. See, for England and Wales, Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical 
Treatment) (No 1) [2001] Fam 147, p. 199-200, 214-215; for the US, see Knutson v The 
State (1987) 736 P.2d 775; Commonwealth v O’Laughlin (2006) 446 Mass. 188; Knight v 
State (1996) 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 5538. In Queensland, see Criminal Code 1899 s 293. 
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not enough, to rescue that distinction, to acknowledge that there can be two 
different ways of causing death: one in which one allows the patient’s underlying 
condition to take effect, the other in which one administers a lethal injection. For 
killing is defined as causing death, so different means of causing death will all fall 
on the ‘killing’ side of the killing/letting die distinction.  Is there a way round this 
problem? 
II. CAUSING DEATH AND LETTING DIE 
Why does the law regard the withdrawal of LST such as ventilation as letting die 
rather than causing death? If acts are involved, why is this case any different from 
the cases so far discussed? Just as letting the room cool down by turning off the 
heating can still amount to causing the room to cool down, so, surely, allowing the 
patient to die by turning off the ventilator still amounts to causing the patient’s 
death.  
The reason the law resists this conclusion is that it regards as significant the fact 
that LST has been provided in the first place, and so regards the withdrawal as 
offset by its initial provision. Why is this? Consider a patient, Tom, who needs 
mechanical ventilation in order to survive. Any delay in placing Tom on ventilation 
will mean that he will in fact die. Suppose that, on May 1, Tom is obtunded, and 
the medical team intubate and mechanically ventilate him. Suppose then that 
Tom later awakens and regains competence. Knowing that he cannot survive 
without ventilation, he indicates that he no longer wishes to be ventilator 
dependent but would rather be allowed to die. This happens on May 18. Here, the 
provision of the ventilation has prolonged Tom’s life sufficiently to allow him to 
regain capacity and make a decision for himself about whether he could live with 
constant ventilation. If the ventilation had not been given, he would already have 
16 
 
died. In this context, the law regards its withdrawal as a delayed withholding – a 
withholding of further ventilation at the point at which the doctors are satisfied, 
having explored all avenues with him, that he does not want continued 
ventilation. The only reason we are in the situation to make the decision on May 
18 is that we acted to provide ventilation on May 1. But for that action of 
providing the ventilation on May 1, Tom would already have died. Moreover, but 
for its on-going provision, Tom could have died at any point if the treatment had 
been withdrawn at that point. Since the treatment is life-extending, and is 
continually required to prevent death from occurring when it otherwise would, 
then what is caused when treatment is withdrawn is not death but merely the 
timing of death. For death is merely being held at bay; we prevent death only in 
the sense that we hold it back. We do not prevent it in the sense of removing its 
possibility. When, therefore, the time comes to withdraw the treatment, the law 
looks at the net effect of its initiation and cessation.24 Any causal consequence 
that ensues at the time of withdrawal is regarded as offset by the initial and 
ongoing provision of the LST, without which the patient would already have died.  
We can put the point another way. Leaving aside the possibility of giving a lethal 
injection or other lethal potion which is clearly unlawful, the only way a doctor is 
able to ‘cause’ death is by withdrawing LST. But doctors are only in a position to 
do this because life-prolonging treatment is being provided in the first place – life 
is being preserved.25 In this sense, we cause only the timing of death on 
withdrawal (the patient dies now at t2 because we extended her life at t1 and 
have continued to prolong it up to t2). Moreover, when on-going life-prolonging 
treatment is being given, life has not been saved in the way that the life of a 
                                                          
24 J. McMahan. 1994. Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid. In Killing and Letting Die. 
2nd edn. B. Steinbock & A. Norcross, eds. New York, NY: Fordham University Press, p. 389. 
25 The implications of this point for the interloper objection are discussed in section III. 
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drowning man has been saved. In the case of conditions requiring on-going 
mechanical ventilation, the threat cannot be entirely removed, but only its effects 
averted in an on-going way. It is therefore meaningful to regard the treatment as 
delaying death rather than removing its possibility, and so as controlling only its 
timing. 
It is on a basis such as this that the law adopts what is known as the equivalence 
principle,26 namely, that just as lawful withholding LST is ethical and does not 
cause death, so lawful provision and then subsequent withdrawal of LST is ethical 
and does not cause death either. For if we are merely delaying death by providing 
life-prolonging measures, then, in a sense, we are delaying the point at which we 
withhold those measures. The withdrawal merely allows a process that was 
underway, but then halted in its tracks, to resume, which is equivalent to a later 
decision not to halt the process in its tracks. In this sense, the prolongation of the 
patient’s life offsets the withdrawal and is the flip side of the withdrawal. 
Also relevant is the fact that, as Miller and Truog concede, not initiating LST, in the 
absence of any duty to initiate it, does not cause the patient’s death. It would be 
very odd if, once there is no longer a duty to keep providing on-going treatment 
having initiated it, stopping that treatment does cause death, but its non-
provision in the first place, in the absence of such a duty, does not cause death. If 
not instituting the treatment counts as letting die, then instituting treatment 
stops the process of letting die. Withdrawing the treatment down the track 
resumes the process of letting die. There is nothing absurd or unreasonable in 
such a view.  
                                                          
26 I have taken the term ‘equivalence principle’ from Robert Truog. 
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It might be objected that what I have referred to, following Robert Truog, as the 
equivalence principle only shows that it is as ethical to withdraw LST as it is to 
withhold it in the first place, but does not show that death is not caused by 
withdrawing LST.27 But such an objection begs the question because part of the 
reason why we might regard withholding of LST (a non-intervention) as ethical is 
precisely that, as Miller and Truog themselves concede, it does not cause death 
(in the absence of a duty to sustain life) but, instead, merely lets the patient die. 
That being so, an obvious reason for regarding withdrawal as equivalent to 
withholding is that it, too, lets the patient die rather than causing death. True, 
there could be other reasons why the two should be regarded as equivalent, even 
if one were merely letting die, while the other one were causing death (killing). 
But I contend that a prime candidate reason why they might be regarded as 
equivalent is to do with our sense that a decision not to further prolong 
someone’s life is not materially different from a decision not to prolong it in the 
first place, because one is only in the position to choose whether to further 
prolong someone’s life if one has been prolonging it to begin with, and thereby 
delaying the time at which one makes a decision to withhold that further 
treatment. In short, the point is that, from the point of view of causation, 
withdrawal is in the same position as – and hence is “equivalent” to – withholding 
because withdrawal itself is only possible in the first place if the onset of death is 
being delayed, deferred or postponed by the provision of life-sustaining 
measures, in the absence of which it already would have occurred.  
 
                                                          
27 Thanks to Franklin Miller for raising this point.  
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III. DOES THIS ANALYSIS UNTENABLY MAKE THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSON 
ENGAGING IN THE CONDUCT RELEVANT TO ITS CLASSIFICATION AS 
KILLING OR LETTING DIE? 
We must now confront one of the main objections with which we began this 
paper. The analysis just given surely would apply equally to an interloper or an 
unauthorised withdrawal just as much as it applies to the authorised medical 
practitioner. Surely, when an interloper or a loved one withdraws the ventilator-
dependent patient from the ventilator, then the interloper or loved one, too, 
must benefit from the fact that the treatment was initially provided and so offsets 
their withdrawal, and so they merely let the patient die rather than kill the 
patient? How can it be that the interloper kills the patient whereas the doctor 
merely lets the patient die? As Savulescu puts it, following Dan Brock,28 “the 
nature of some physical event cannot logically depend on the identity of the 
person involved”. ‘Running’ is no less running, whoever undertakes it.   
However, the principle of equivalence need not apply to unauthorised or unlawful 
withdrawal. As Jeff McMahan points out,  if the ‘withdrawer’ of aid is not the 
same person as, or is not operating in the same role29 as, the ‘saver’ in such a 
case, this makes a difference to whether we classify the conduct as killing or as 
                                                          
28 D. Brock. 1999. Voluntary active euthanasia.  In Contemporary Issues in Bioethics.  5th 
edn. T.L. Beauchamp & L. Walters, eds. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing: 296-305. 
29 This qualification is needed because in many cases – and in intensive care cases – the 
saver acts in his capacity as the occupant of a role, and not in his capacity as an individual. 
It therefore is irrelevant that this particular individual may then finish his or her shift and 
the doctor on the next shift is the one to withdraw the LST. 
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letting die.30 We can illustrate McMahan’s point by means of an analogy. Suppose 
you owe $600 to Dan. Suppose too that I know that you owe that amount to Dan. 
If I withdraw your $600 of money from the cash machine with your bank card 
without your permission and give it to Dan, I am guilty of theft. If you withdraw it 
yourself and give it to Dan, that is not theft. The result is the same: you have $600 
less in your account than you did when I withdrew it and gave it to Dan, and $600 
less in your account when you withdrew it and gave it to Dan. And Dan now has 
the money that you owe him. Further, we both withdraw your money and hand it 
to Dan – the same physical event of withdrawal and handing it to Dan takes place. 
But the crucial difference is that my identity is relevant in this case to the 
characterisation of the conduct. If I withdraw it and give it to Dan, that is theft 
(and your debt to Dan is not, strictly speaking, discharged even though he now 
has the $600 of your money that you owe him). If you withdraw it and give it to 
Dan, by contrast, it is not theft, and your debt to Dan is discharged. Your conduct 
counts instead as ‘discharging your debt’ to Dan.  
Savulescu’s objection can now be answered. The fact that the same physical 
conduct is engaged in by the interloper as is engaged in by the doctor is not 
decisive of the question whether the conduct is killing or letting die. Savulescu’s 
                                                          
30 J. McMahan op.cit. note 22, pp. 389, 398ff.  Savulescu concedes McMahan’s point and 
shifts immediately to the altogether different argument that there is no moral relevance 
between the killing/letting die distinction: Savulescu, op. cit. note 1, p. 257. But such a 
shift is a significant concession. The argument that it is incoherent to regard withdrawal as 
letting die if undertaken by the doctor but killing if undertaken by the interloper is 
abandoned by this shift. Strictly speaking, Savulescu should therefore have dropped his 
first criticism and focused only on the moral relevance point. That he doesn’t do so 
suggests that, in spite of conceding the point, he still thinks there is something to it. 
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example of running is the wrong analogy. That is equivalent to withdrawal, an 
action of the body. We are interested, however, in whether withdrawal is, in the 
case of the cash, theft and in the case of the LST, killing. Whether the physical 
action of withdrawing cash from the cash machine is theft depends partly on the 
identity of the person withdrawing the cash – whether it is you, the account 
owner, who are withdrawing the cash, or whether it is I who am using your card 
to withdraw it without authorisation even if only to give the cash back to you. 
Similarly, the law can look at the identity of the person, or of the role of the 
person, withdrawing LST to decide whether withdrawal is a case of allowing to die 
rather than killing. Although, in one sense, both an interloper and an authorised 
doctor allow the resumption of the process that has been staved off by the 
provision of LST, the fact that the person withdrawing the LST is not the person 
who saved, and is continuing to save, the patient means that he is actively 
intervening in the saving of the patient by the doctor and hospital charged with 
the care of the patient. We can’t regard the interloper as stopping what he 
started because he didn’t start it.31 There is no sense, then, in which we can say 
that the interloper ceases saving the patient or stops treating him and this fact is 
relevant to how it is we classify what he is doing. And a rogue doctor who started 
the measures but decided he should withdraw even though there is no lawful 
basis to do so cannot benefit from the fact that he initially saved the patient 
either because the patient would continue living if he didn’t stop saving him 
                                                          
31 It is worth noting, too, that Savulescu’s objection, following Brock, that the ‘same 
physical event’ is involved depends on limiting the scope of that event just to the 
withdrawal. If the event included the actions of commencing the treatment as well as 
stopping it, then the actions themselves would not be the same, for only the authorised 
doctor’s actions would include the commencing of the treatment.  
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prematurely. Another way of putting this point, however, is to say that, in such a 
case, letting die would itself be a form of killing because the allowing is not offset 
by an initial provision.32   
It might be objected that the theft/discharging a loan analogy does not work 
because killing is not necessarily wrong, whereas theft (or stealing) is, by 
definition, the taking of someone’s property without their permission and so is a 
wrong to the person whose property is taken33 (even if we can think of 
circumstances, such as starvation, where it might be considered justified). This 
difference can be conceded for the sake of argument, but it does not affect the 
cogency of the analogy. The point of the analogy is only to illustrate the claim that 
performing the same physical actions is not a sufficient condition of ‘doing the 
same thing’.  Is the physical action of taking the wallet out of the bag theft or 
borrowing? Is the physical action of taking the tube out of the patient’s mouth 
killing or letting die? So, the fact that the idea of wrongful taking is built into the 
notion of theft (whereas the idea of the wrongful taking of life is not necessarily 
built into the idea of killing) does not affect the point that further facts than the 
                                                          
32 Note however that the law deems it to be a killing. There is much debate in the ethics 
literature about whether moral intuitions are really driving the analysis concerning 
whether a given stretch of conduct is killing or letting die.  If we classify the rogue doctor 
case as killing, this seems to be because we regard the doctor as engaging in wrongful 
conduct. The law acknowledges that this kind of case would still, strictly speaking, count as 
letting die, but brings it within the category of killing by linking causation to expectations 
in the circumstances that a doctor would continue to provide treatment. But rather than 
stating boldly that it is killing, it deems it to be killing. See, eg, s 296 of the Criminal Code 
1899 (Qld).  
33 Thanks to Franklin Miller for raising this objection. 
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simple fact that money is withdrawn from a teller machine or a tube is withdrawn 
from a patient are required to determine how to characterise the conduct in 
question. More analysis than that offered by Brock and Savulescu is therefore 
necessary in order for them to sustain the conclusion that they reach.  
It is also worth stressing that the question is not whether causing death should be 
classified as killing or letting die. Rather, the question is whether withdrawal of 
the tube is causing death (killing as defined at law), or letting die, and that 
question is partly determined by the considerations I have already examined, 
including whether you have been prolonging life in the first place and whether it is 
meaningful to describe you as stopping what you have been doing – a description 
that cannot apply to the interloper since the interloper has not been extending 
life in the first place. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the standard criticisms of the reasoning in the Bland decision for 
categorising withdrawal of LST as an omission are prima facie plausible, closer 
inspection of the reasons for that classification shows that the criticism, at least in 
the case of the withdrawal of ANH and similar periodic treatment such as dialysis 
and some forms of artificial ventilation, is unfounded. Nonetheless, difficulties do 
remain with that classification in respect of treatment that is ongoing, such as 
some forms of invasive ventilation where patients are completely dependent on 
constant ventilation for their continued survival. However, provided that the 
withdrawal of these forms of ongoing treatment is understood as allowing the 
patient to die, we can understand why a court might regard them as equivalent to 
withholding the treatment in the first place, and so as an omission. Still, if we feel 
that this classification as an omission is untenable in these cases, it is less 
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untenable to regard the withdrawal as letting die, rather than killing, and it is on 
that basis that the law adopted the view that these forms of withdrawal might be 
regarded as omissions. ‘Omission’ here should be understood as letting die. 
Although the classification of withdrawal as letting die can itself be contested, we 
have seen that the arguments offered against that classification are not 
altogether successful, and that there are reasonable grounds for classifying 
withdrawal as letting die. Further, there are reasonable grounds for classifying 
withdrawal undertaken by an interloper or other unauthorised withdrawal as an 
active intervention into the regime of treatment being given by the medical team 
and so as killing rather than letting die. The contradiction Savulescu and others 
purport to identify in that mode of classification is, for the reasons given above, 
merely apparent rather than real. 
